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Abstract 
This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in 
unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned 
with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally 
the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and 
workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing 
a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empiri-
cal studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion. 
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IFAU – Improving incentives in unemployment insurance  2 1 Introduction 
The economics of unemployment insurance (UI) has been an active research 
area for over two decades or so. Most of the research has been concerned with 
positive analysis, such as the effects of UI benefits on the duration of unem-
ployment.
1 Less interest has been devoted to the welfare issues concerning the 
design of an optimal UI system. The ultimate rationale for public UI is to 
provide income insurance for risk-averse workers. The provision of UI does not 
come without adverse incentive effects, however. For example, more generous 
UI is likely to reduce search effort and raise wage pressure, thus causing some 
increase in unemployment. The challenge facing policy makers is thus to strike 
an optimal balance between the insurance benefits on the one hand, and the 
adverse incentive effects on the other hand. 
There are several conceivable instruments to restore incentives without 
reducing the insurance protection offered by the UI system. The purpose of the 
present paper is to review three such instruments: (i) the duration of benefit 
payments; (ii) monitoring in conjunction with sanctions; and (iii) workfare. We 
review the theoretical justifications for introducing these instruments as well as 
the empirical literature on their effects.  
The adverse incentive effects associated with the provision of UI may be 
caused by moral hazard or adverse selection. The moral hazard problems 
appear in various guises. The most frequently discussed margin of adjustment 
is probably job search. A well-known result from a prototype search model 
states that higher UI benefits raise the reservation wage and thereby the 
expected duration of unemployment. Another potential source of moral hazard 
arises from decisions taken by employed workers regarding work effort. Since 
UI affects the cost of job loss, the generosity of benefits may conceivably 
influence the choice of effort and hence the probability of retaining the job. 
Moral hazard problems may also appear through the linkage between UI bene-
fits – and UI financing – and wage and employment contracts.  
The issue of adverse selection arises because some characteristics of insured 
agents are unobserved by the UI provider. The consequences for UI design of 
unobserved characteristics among the insured depend on the precise nature of 
the individual heterogeneity. The sources of heterogeneity are many, including 
                                                      
1 See Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Holmlund (1998) for two surveys and assessments 
of the literature on UI and unemployment. 
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leisure. The literature on adverse selection problems in UI is relatively small, 
perhaps reflecting the analytical difficulties of incorporating worker heteroge-
neity in a tractable manner.
2 Adverse selection may provide a rationale for 
obligatory insurance. 
The fact that the characteristics or actions are unobserved does not neces-
sarily mean that they are unobservable; information may be available at a cost. 
Monitoring of job search and work tests are examples of devices whereby the 
insurer can obtain information about search effort and availability for work 
among the insured. 
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the economics of optimal 
UI design. This literature has focused on various moral hazard problems and 
provided new insights into the tradeoffs between insurance benefits and incen-
tives. The main purpose of our paper is to review some of this literature and 
relate it to the relevant empirical literature.  
We begin in the next section by considering the issue of time sequencing of 
benefits. The question posed in this literature is whether benefits should be paid 
at a fixed rate over the spell of unemployment or decline (or increase) over the 
spell. This issue was discussed in a few seminal contributions on optimal UI 
published in the late 1970s and has attracted new attention in recent research.  
In section 3 we consider monitoring and sanctions. The issues involved con-
cern how much resources should be spent on checking search behavior and 
how sanctions, such as benefit cuts, should be implemented if prescribed search 
requirements are not met. These issues have been discussed in policy circles 
but only rarely been the subject of research. 
Section 4 considers workfare, i.e., the requirement that a benefit recipient 
participate in some work activity in exchange for benefits. This idea has been 
on the policy agenda for a very long time; indeed, examples of workfare in 
France and Britain can be traced centuries back (Besley and Coate, 1992). 
Workfare has been thoroughly scrutinized in the public finance literature on 
poverty alleviation. In the context of UI, workfare has sometimes been dis-
cussed in conjunction with active labor market policies. One idea in this dis-
cussion is that labor market programs can be useful to implement the work test 
                                                      
2 Jones (1986) and Chiu and Karni (1998) are two contributions of note. In these two models, the 
absence of private UI despite risk-averse individuals is explained by adverse selection. 
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to much rigorous formal analysis.  
In connection to each section we provide a concise summary of the material 




2  The time sequencing of benefits 
The positive analysis of fixed benefit duration began in the late 1970s with a 
paper by Mortensen (1977). It is important to understand some of the implica-
tions from this analysis in order to appreciate the more recent normative 
analysis of UI design. Therefore, we begin by offering a brief account of the 
microeconomic theory as well as the evidence pertaining to finite benefit 
duration. 
 
2.1  The effects of fixed benefit duration 
The basic microeconomic theory of how UI compensation affects job search is 
presented in Mortensen (1977). Other contributions include Burdett (1979), 
Mortensen (1990) and van den Berg (1990, 1994). The theory portrays an 
unemployed worker engaged in sequential search with the objective to 
maximize the present value of lifetime income (or utility). Mortensen (1977) 
allows for fixed duration of benefit payments and stochastic duration of 
employment spells. There is also an eligibility condition requiring a certain 
amount of work experience in order to qualify for UI. The wage offer 
distribution is taken as stationary and known by the unemployed searcher. 
The most important implications derived from this model are the following: 
First, the unemployed worker's reservation wage declines as he approaches the 
date at which benefits expire; hence the exit rate increases over the spell of 
(insured) unemployment. Second, an increase in the benefit level makes it more 
attractive for presently not eligible workers to accept jobs and thereby become 
qualified for benefits in the future; higher benefits thus result in an increase in 
the exit rate from unemployment to employment for workers who are not 
qualified for benefits, a response known as the "entitlement effect". Third, a 
rise in the benefit level will cause a newly unemployed and insured worker to 
increase his reservation wage but induce an insured worker close to benefit 
exhaustion to reduce his reservation wage. The exit rate thus declines for 
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workers who have come close to benefit exhaustion. The last property follows 
from the fact that a higher benefit level increases both the value of continued 
search as unemployed and the value of accepting an offer. The immediate value 
of higher benefits is small for workers close to benefit exhaustion, as they are 
almost in the same situation as workers not qualified for UI. 
A large empirical literature has used micro data on individual unemploy-
ment spells to investigate how changes in the benefit parameters affect job 
findings. There is fairly strong support for the hypothesis that benefits matter 
for job findings, although there is little consensus on the magnitude of the 
effects. Layard et al. (1991) characterizes the empirical research as “the basic 
result is that the elasticity of expected duration with respect to benefits is 
generally in the range 0.2-0.9”. The evidence on the impact of the potential 
duration of benefits is largely in favor of the theory: exit rates from unemploy-
ment do seem to increase as workers approach the time when benefits are due 
to expire. Evidence from the United States is reported by Moffitt (1985), Meyer 
(1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990), evidence from Canada by Ham and Rea 
(1987), Swedish evidence by Carling et al. (1996), French evidence by 
Dormont et al. (2001), and evidence from Spain in Ahn and Garcia-Perez 
(1999) and Jenkins and Garcia-Serrano (2000). 
The intriguing third prediction of this theory – that workers close to benefit 
exhaustion will respond to higher benefits by lowering the reservation wage – 
has rarely been tested in empirical research. It has been common to include 
measures of benefits or replacement rates without allowing for different effects 
between those who have just entered the unemployment pool and those who are 
close to benefit exhaustion. If the theory is correct, however, the estimates of 
benefit effects are likely to be sensitive to the duration composition of the 
samples at hand. The study by Katz and Meyer (1990) on U.S. data attempts to 
test Mortensen’s third prediction. They examine the determinants of exits out 
of unemployment and include among the covariates an interaction term 
between the benefit level and time until benefit exhaustion. The estimated 
coefficient has a sign consistent with the theoretical prediction but it is not 
quite significant. Carling et al. (2001) report unsuccessful attempts to find any 
significant interaction effect. 
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The seminal papers on optimal UI appeared in the late 1970s (Baily, 1977, 
1978; Flemming, 1978; Shavell and Weiss, 1979). Shavell and Weiss presented 
the first analysis of the optimal sequencing of benefits. As a benchmark, we 
begin by giving a brief account of their study. Then we move on to consider 
recent research.  
 
Shavell and Weiss (1979) 
Consider a model of job search with identical and risk-averse individuals where 
the employment state is absorbing, i.e., once the worker has found a job he 
stays in it forever. The probability of job finding is partially under the control 
of the job searcher through the choice of effort and reservation wage. The 
objective of the UI provider is taken to be the maximization of the unemploy-
ment entrant’s expected utility subject to a fixed UI budget. The latter budget is 
defined as the expected discounted amount that the insurer has to spend per 
unemployed individual. (The optimization problem can equivalently be treated 
as one of minimization of the UI budget subject to a given expected utility on 
the part of the worker.) 
Shavell and Weiss derived several results from their model. Under the most 
restrictive assumptions – no wealth, no borrowing, and no moral hazard prob-
lem – the benefit level should be constant over the spell of unemployment. By 
introducing moral hazard, this result is overturned and it is found that the 
benefit level should decline monotonically over the spell, the reason being that 
a declining benefit profile provides stronger incentives to search. However, 
Shavell and Weiss were not able to characterize the benefit profile in the 
general case with moral hazard and where the individual has initial wealth and 
can borrow (except for a special case).  
 
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) 
Recently a number of papers have extended the analysis of Shavell and Weiss. 
One strand of the literature stays within the Shavell and Weiss framework in 
the sense that the focus is solely on the behavior of the worker. One example is 
the paper by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) who enlarge the set of policy 
instruments by considering a wage tax after reemployment in conjunction with 
the sequence of benefit payments. The model is one where agents are risk 
averse and the unemployed worker’s probability of finding a new job depends 
on search effort, which is unobserved by the UI provider. The worker has no 
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income are ruled out by assumption, so income equals consumption in each 
state. All workers are identical, infinitely lived and receive the same 
(exogenous) wage while employed. Employment is treated as an absorbing 
state, i.e., there is no risk of reentering unemployment in the future.  
The optimal UI program is taken to involve minimization of the UI budget – 
the expected discounted value of UI transfers – subject to a prescribed expected 
discounted utility to the worker. Two instruments are available that allow the 
insurer – the principal – to control the worker’s – the agent’s – consumption in 
each state, viz. unemployment benefits and a wage tax. Benefits can vary by 
elapsed duration and the wage tax is allowed to depend on the worker’s 
unemployment history. The wage tax is constant over the reemployed worker’s 
(infinite) employment spell. Moreover, the tax can take negative values, in 
which case it acts as a subsidy to job finding.  
The most important analytical results are as follows. First, unemployment 
benefits should decrease over the elapsed duration of unemployment. Second, 
the wage tax should under some (sufficient) conditions increase with the length 
of the previous unemployment spell. The intuition for those results is that both 
instruments – the declining benefit profile and the rising tax profile – encour-
age job finding by making prolonged job search more expensive.  
Hopenhayn and Nicolini also present numerical simulations so as to gauge 
the welfare effects of switching from the current UI system in the United States 
to an optimal system. These simulations suggest that the welfare gains can be 
substantial. The cost savings from an optimal system relative to the current 
system amount to almost 30 percent. The decline in replacement rates over 
elapsed duration is much smaller compared to an optimal system without a 
wage tax. The reason is that the “one-instrument” policy can only affect 
intertemporal incentives by varying benefits over time, whereas consumption 
possibilities during a future employment spell is beyond the principal’s control. 
The “two-instrument” policy has the virtue of improving intertemporal 
consumption smoothing as well as intertemporal incentives. The computed 
optimal replacement rates in the “two-instrument” case are remarkably high, 
ranging from 99 percent of the wage during the first weeks of unemployment to 
94 percent after one year’s unemployment. The optimal time profile in the 
absence of a wage tax involves a decline in replacement rates from 86 percent 
during the first week to 13 percent after one year of unemployment. The 
optimal wage tax is negative for workers with short previous unemployment 
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find jobs quickly (within five weeks). The tax imposes a large penalty for long 
spells of unemployment. If the spell lasts for six months, the tax amounts to 2 
percent of the pre-tax wage; if it lasts for 12 months, the tax is 4.5 percent. 
Since the tax is paid forever, these penalties are huge. The penalty associated 
with finding a job after one year of unemployment rather than after five weeks 
of unemployment amounts to 4.5 percent of the present value of employment.  
The analysis of Hopenhayn and Nicolini is a useful extension of the Shavell 
and Weiss contribution. Still, there are reasons to take the numerical exercises 
with caution since the model is highly stylized. One restrictive feature of the 
model is the absence of unemployment risk once employed. Hopenhayn and 
Nicolini report, however, that their results remain broadly intact if exogenous 
job terminations and multiple unemployment spells are allowed for. Benefits 
should then decline – and the wage tax increase – with the length of the current 
as well as the previous unemployment spells. This is an interesting finding that 
may have broader implications. For example, if the UI system penalizes previ-
ous unemployment in general – the length of spells as well as the number of 
spells – one would expect effects on behavior determining unemployment in-
flow. The larger the penalty to past unemployment experiences, the more 
important it is to prevent the occurrence of unemployment. The incentives to 
prevent unemployment incidence may influence the choices of occupation and 
industry and also the design of employment contracts.  
Hopenhayn and Nicolini ignore the issue of how the UI system influences 
search behavior among those who are not qualified for UI. New entrants 
account for a substantial fraction of inflow into unemployment and they are 
typically not covered by UI since previous employment experience is required. 
As shown by Mortensen (1977), this feature of UI gives rise to an “entitlement 
effect”. This effect may well have important implications for the design of 
optimal UI. Another restrictive feature is the fixed wage assumption. In a 
search equilibrium framework, as well as in other models of equilibrium unem-
ployment, there is a link between benefits and wages, which in turn implies a 
relationship between benefits and job creation. The endogenous response of 
wages to benefits may potentially prove to be an important channel that affects 
the optimal design of UI. 
The fact that the wage tax appears so attractive according Hopenhayn and 
Nicolini raises the question of whether it is practically feasible. The answer 
appears to be a qualified yes. The length of insured unemployment is observ-
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employed worker. In fact, this is similar to the system of “experience rating” 
practiced in the Canadian UI system. Here workers with substantial use of UI 
over the past years – in one or several spells – are forced to “repay” more of 
their collected benefits. The Canadian system may also discourage repeat 
entries into unemployment from employment. 
 
Wang and Williamson (1996) 
Wang and Williamson (1996) call into question the result that benefits should 
fall monotonically over the unemployment spell. They add another source of 
moral hazard by examining an environment where a worker’s employment 
status depends on the choice of effort. The transition rate from unemployment 
to employment is increasing in search effort; analogously, the probability of 
remaining employed is increasing in work effort. The model thereby makes job 
destruction endogenous and affected by the UI policy through the worker’s 
choice of effort. Workers cannot lend or borrow, as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini. 
The wage upon reemployment is exogenous and identical across workers. The 
model incorporates a flow of new entrants in the labor market and the eligibil-
ity condition that employment is required in order to qualify for benefits. 
Unemployed workers not receiving UI benefits are eligible for a welfare bene-
fit that is taken as a fixed fraction of the wage. 
The optimal UI system – implied by an objective function similar to the one 
used by Hopenhayn and Nicolini – involves a large drop in consumption in the 
first period of unemployment (so as to discourage shirking), and a large 
reemployment bonus (so as to encourage search effort). The implied time 
profile of UI compensation is thus non-monotonic; compensation increases 
initially and then falls throughout the spell. The numerical examples suggest 
that the optimal system involves a reduction in unemployment relative to 
unemployment in the prevailing US system by more than three percentage 
points and an increase in output by more than three percent. These results are 
driven by declines in job destruction, reflecting a high elasticity of job retention 
with respect to effort on the job, and a rise in mean effort on the job.  
It is difficult to assess the empirical plausibility of these results. There is 
virtually no empirical evidence available on the relationship between job 
destruction and workers’ choice of effort. The importance attributed to on-the-
job effort for job destruction is probably overstated. In fact, workers who quit 
or who are fired for cause are typically not eligible for UI in existing systems. 
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shirking incentives arising from UI. 
It is noteworthy, however, that existing UI systems (and other social insur-
ance schemes, such as health insurance) often involve a waiting period before 
benefits are paid out. This discourages entry into unemployment. In addition to 
the conceivable effect on shirking behavior, the waiting period may also affect 
wage and employment contracts. A large penalty to unemployment entry will 
reduce the attractiveness of implicit contracts with repeated use of temporary 
layoffs. A system with a waiting period may also be cost efficient by reducing 
the administrative burden on the UI system.  
 
Davidson and Woodbury (1997) 
The paper by Davidson and Woodbury (1997) examines whether benefits 
should be paid indefinitely or for a fixed number of weeks by using a search 
and matching framework, albeit with a fixed number of jobs and exogenous 
wages. Since the number of jobs is given, search effort is the sole determinant 
of unemployment. The government’s objective is to choose the level of UI 
benefits and the potential duration of benefits to maximize aggregate expected 
lifetime income, taking optimal search behavior among the unemployed and a 
budget restriction into account.  
The study argues that the optimal UI program should offer risk-averse 
workers indefinite benefit payment, a conclusion that seems to suggest that 
most existing UI programs with finite benefit periods are sub-optimal. In fact, 
the numerical examples suggest that the optimal replacement rate should 
exceed unity for UI programs with potential benefit duration less than 32 
weeks. If the program involves benefit payment for 26 weeks, as is usually the 
case in the United States, the optimal replacement rate is as high as 1.30. 
However, a program with unlimited duration dominates programs with limited 
benefit duration; the computed optimal replacement rate is 0.66 in the bench-
mark case with unlimited duration. 
Davidson’s and Woodbury’s results are striking but are obtained under 
restrictive assumptions. First, wages and the number of jobs are treated as 
fixed. Second, and more crucially, they do not analyze the optimal time se-
quence of benefit payments. Instead they compare two extremes, viz. unlimited 
duration on the one hand and finite duration followed by zero income after 
benefit exhaustion on the other hand. There are thus only two instruments at the 
government’s disposal. By expanding the set of instruments – to include 
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ing benefit profile dominates the flat profile considered by Davidson and 
Woodbury.  
 
Cahuc and Lehmann (1997, 2000) 
The paper by Cahuc and Lehmann (1997) examines how the time sequencing 
of benefits affect equilibrium unemployment in a model with an endogenous 
number of jobs and union-firm bargaining over wages. A key assumption is 
that it is the short-term unemployed that affect wage setting. In case of 
disagreement in the negotiations, the “insiders” involved in the bargain become 
short-term unemployed and eligible for UI payments. A declining time profile 
of benefits thus improves the fallback position of the insiders and this tends to 
raise wage pressure and cause higher unemployment. Indeed, the paper finds 
that a constant time sequence yields a lower unemployment rate than a program 
with a declining time profile (taking the tax rate as exogenous).  
Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) is a more recent version of the model where 
endogenous job search is allowed for. The model then becomes too complex to 
yield analytical results and the authors turn to a number of numerical examples. 
One noteworthy feature of this analysis is the computation of welfare effects of 
alternative time profiles for both short-term and long-term unemployed as well 
as for employed workers. In these experiments, the tax rate is held constant so 
there is no attempt to characterize the optimal UI system (in which case one 
would choose the tax rate along with the UI parameters subject to a govern-
ment budget restriction). The simulations illustrate that a declining time profile 
tends to encourage search effort and thereby reduce unemployment (albeit at 
the cost of lower welfare for the long-term unemployed). When both search 
and wages are endogenous, the simulations still imply that a declining profile 
lowers unemployment and leads to higher aggregate welfare compared to a flat 
profile. However, the decline in unemployment is weaker compared to the case 
with exogenous wages, the reason being the rise in wage pressure. 
 
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001)  
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) address the question of the optimal se-
quencing of benefits using an equilibrium model of search unemployment 
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3. They allow for endogenous search 
effort among unemployed workers and, in contrast to Shavell and Weiss 
(1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Wang and Williamson (1996) and 
Davidson and Woodbury (1997), incorporate endogenous wage determination 
and free entry of new jobs. The UI program affects search effort as well as the 
wage bargains.  
For analytical tractability, the paper mainly focuses on a two-tiered UI 
system, i.e., a program with two benefit levels where the first is referred to as 
UI and the second as unemployment assistance (UA)
4. Workers who lose their 
jobs are entitled to UI. UI benefits may not be paid indefinitely, however. 
Workers losing their benefits are entitled to UA that has infinite duration but is 
potentially lower than UI payments. The paper asks whether a two-tiered 
system dominates, in welfare terms, a program with indefinite payments of a 
constant wage replacement rate. The answer to this question turns out to be an 
unambiguous yes, provided that discounting is ignored. The result carries over 
to the case with a multi-tiered benefit structure; unemployment benefits should 
decline monotonically over the spell of unemployment. A feature known from 
models of individual worker search drives the key result: the effect of higher 
benefits on the individual worker’s search behavior depends on whether he is 
presently qualified for UI or not. A rise in benefits will in general increase 
search effort among those not insured, as this will bring them quicker to 
employment that results in eligibility for future UI payments. A two-tiered UI 
system exploits this “entitlement effect” by providing incentives for active 
search among workers not currently entitled to benefits. 
With discounting, the optimality of a declining benefit sequence cannot be 
established analytically. The reason for the ambiguity lies in the fact that a 
declining sequence increases the welfare of the short-term unemployed at the 
expense of the long-term unemployed, which in turn induces stronger wage 
pressure than a flat (or increasing) sequence; this is the mechanism discussed in 
the papers by Cahuc and Lehmann. According to the numerical calibrations, 
however, this “wage pressure effect” is dominated by the case for exploiting 
the entitlement effect.  
                                                      
3 The first version of Fredriksson and Holmlund was circulated during 1997 and appeared as a 
Working Paper in February 1998.  
4 Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) use the term ‘social assistance’ rather than unemployment 
assistance. 
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around 40 percent, the exact magnitude depending, inter alia, on relative risk 
aversion. The optimal ratio between UI and UA varies between 1.7 and 2, with 
the larger number implied by higher relative risk aversion (equal to two). The 
welfare gain of moving from the optimal uniform to the optimal differentiated 
system is non-trivial. In the example with highest risk aversion, workers would 
be willing to pay around one percent of their consumption flow in order to 
move from the uniform to the differentiated system. The effect on overall 
unemployment of moving from the optimal uniform to the optimally differenti-
ated system is negligible, however. 
 
2.3 Summary  and  discussion 
What conclusions can be drawn from the literature regarding the optimal time 
profile of benefit payments over the spell of unemployment? In our view, the 
case for a declining time profile is reasonably well developed. A declining 
profile provides better search incentives than a flat (or increasing) profile. 
There are some caveats to this conclusion. First, as emphasized by Cahuc and 
Lehmann, there is a possibility that this design encourages wage pressure. 
However, it has not been convincingly demonstrated that this effect is so quan-
titatively important that it overturns the argument for restoring search incen-
tives. A second caveat follows from the observation, made by Wang and 
Williamson, that it may be optimal to impose a “tax” on entry into unemploy-
ment by offering low benefits during the first week(s) of unemployment. We 
believe that the shirking argument for this policy is overstated but other 
mechanisms may suggest a case for low benefits during the first week(s) of 
unemployment. We discuss two examples. 
The use of a waiting period before UI benefits is paid out is a feature of 
some existing systems. This effectively works as a tax on entry into unem-
ployment and may be desirable as a means to discourage the use of temporary 
layoffs subsidized by UI. However, temporary layoffs can also be taken care of 
by experience rating provisions. That is, firms that engage in frequent layoffs 
can be taxed in proportion to their contribution to the layoffs, a key feature of 
the UI system in the United States.
5 It is also plausible that there are economies 
                                                      
5 A seminal paper on experience rating and temporary layoffs is Feldstein (1976). For other 
contributions, see Feldstein (1978), Topel (1983, 1985), Burdett and Wright (1989), and 
Anderson and Meyer (2000). 
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cost associated with each UI claim so that the average administration cost per 
week of elapsed duration declines with increasing duration. This might provide 
a rationale for a system with a waiting period so as to reduce the flow of new 
UI claims.  
A related argument revolves around self-insurance through private savings. 
Most of the models of optimal UI have ignored savings, the reason being that 
the modeling difficulties have been substantial. A reasonable conjecture, 
however, is that private savings (including family transfers) can work reasona-
bly well as a substitute to UI for very short spells of unemployment. For this 
additional reason, an optimal UI policy may include a waiting period before 
benefits are paid out. 
A third caveat in the case for declining benefit sequence arises from the 
possibility of self-insurance as such. If unemployed workers have access to a 
market for borrowing and savings, this may have important consequences for 
the characteristics of the optimal UI system.
6 As assets are depleted during the 
course of the unemployment spell, consumption falls and marginal utility 
increases. Without moral hazard problems this would suggest that benefit 
generosity should increase with unemployment duration. This mechanism is 
formalized in a recent paper by Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2002). Workers 
decide whether to search or not and can self-insure via borrowing and saving. 
This is a partial equilibrium model in the sense that wages and the number of 
jobs are fixed. One of the key results derived by Hassler and Rodriguez Mora is 
that with moral hazard and endogenous savings the optimal benefit sequence is 
constant. Heer (2000) analyses the issue by means of a calibrated general 
equilibrium search model with endogenous savings. He focuses on a two-tiered 
benefit system, following the set-up in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001). One 
important result is that the optimal UI compensation decreases over the spell of 
unemployment. Although it is difficult to have a clear understanding of the 
exact mechanisms, Heer’s results suggest that precautionary savings do not 
overturn the case for a declining profile in a more general model of equilibrium 
unemployment.  
 
                                                      
6 Costain (1997) presents one of the first attempts to analyze optimal UI in a general equilibrium 
search model with endogenous savings. He does not examine the time profile of benefits, 
however.  
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In the contributions discussed above, the receipt of unemployment benefits is 
not affected by how hard the worker searches or how choosy he or she is with 
regard to acceptance decisions. In practice, however, the UI systems generally 
condition benefit payments on some performance criteria such as “availability 
for work” and “actively searching for work”. To make sure that these criteria 
are met, the benefit administration engages in some degree of monitoring of the 
unemployed benefit claimants. Monitoring usually takes place through public 
employment agencies. For example, job seekers have to show up with some 
regularity at the employment offices and/or they have to give evidence of job 
applications. A worker who fails to meet certain requirements may be exposed 
to a sanction, for example a temporary cut in benefits. See Grubb (2001) for a 
recent discussion and international comparisons. 
The economics literature dealing with monitoring and sanctions in the 
context of UI is small and of recent origin. There is however a growing litera-
ture on optimal law enforcement that is of relevance for the analysis of optimal 
UI design.
7 We briefly summarize some results from this literature that seem 
potentially relevant for the analysis of optimal UI design. 
 
3.1  The economic theory of law enforcement 
Gary Becker’s paper on crime and punishment is the seminal contribution to 
this literature (Becker, 1968). Becker takes individuals to be rational and risk-
neutral expected utility maximizers who compare benefits and costs of violat-
ing the law. Behavior is affected by the monetary (or other) gains from crime, 
by the probability of being detected if choosing to violate the law, and by the 
severity of the punishment in case a crime is detected. A law violation is opti-
mal as long as the benefit from the action exceeds the expected fine. The 
government can influence incentives primarily by affecting the probability of 
detection and the severity of punishment. The theory of optimal law enforce-
ment is concerned with how the government should choose detection 
probabilities and measures of punishment so as to maximize a social welfare 
function.  
                                                      
7 Recent surveys of the literature are contained in Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell 
(2000). Our discussion draws on these surveys. 
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harmful to society. The social planner has two instruments at its disposal: 
expenditure on detection (monitoring) and a pecuniary sanction (fine). There 
exists a maximum feasible level of the fine, often interpreted as equal to the 
individual’s wealth. Assume also that the sanction can be imposed without 
costs. Under these assumptions (and some additional technical conditions) one 
can show that the optimal fine is the maximal fine: the fine should be set to its 
maximum feasible level. The reason for this result is that sanctions are costless 
whereas monitoring is costly. Absent a bound on the feasible fine, the optimal 
fine would tend to infinity and the probability of detection to zero. However, 
the detection probability is strictly positive when the maximum fine is 
bounded. It follows that an increase in the maximal fine, for example due to an 
increase in wealth, may allow a reduction in the detection probability. 
Much of the recent literature has been concerned with extensions of 
Becker’s analysis in various directions. One insight from this literature is that 
the maximal fine may in fact not be optimal under several plausible conditions. 
Indeed, existing legal systems do not seem to practice maximal fines!  
One modification of Becker’s model is to allow for costly sanctions. It is 
possible that costs of enforcement increase, as the fine gets larger. For exam-
ple, one might argue that more resources will be spent on lawyers etc, the more 
that is at stake in terms of sanctions. When sanctions are socially costly, the 
optimality of the maximum fine is no longer guaranteed. This is as should be 
expected since both monitoring and sanctions are costly and there is no 
presumption that a corner solution would be optimal. It can also be shown that 
the maximal fine may be nonoptimal when individuals are imperfectly 
informed about the probability of apprehension.  
The maximum fine result may also be overturned when individuals are risk 
averse (Polinsky and Shavell, 1979). Risk aversion has in itself a (costless) 
deterrent effect. The safe law-abiding action may be optimal even if the benefit 
from a crime exceeds the expected fine. The risk-averse individual requires a 
risk premium in order to choose a risky criminal activity. This needs to be 
taken into account by the social planner. A higher sanction implies a higher risk 
premium and it is no longer necessarily true that the sanction needs to be the 
maximal feasible one.  
Another extension of the basic Becker model deals with the accuracy of the 
social planner’s information. Individuals may be falsely sanctioned (Type I 
error) or escape sanctions even if they in fact committed a crime (Type II 
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i.e., reducing the probabilities of Type I and Type II errors. Under risk-
neutrality it can be shown that the optimal fine is still the maximal fine. In 
addition, the optimal cost devoted to improving accuracy (as well as detection) 
is positive. Increasing the probability of detection as well as improving accu-
racy can raise deterrence and there is a tradeoff between the two instruments. If 
the social planner is strongly averse to legal errors it may however be the case 
that an interior solution – a sanction less than the maximal one – is optimal.  
Yet another reason for why the optimal sanction may be less than the 
maximal one is avoidance activities. The higher the sanction, the higher – 
presumably – the resources used by offenders to avoid it. This means that a 
sanction is no longer costless which needs to be considered in the social 
welfare function. An interior solution then again appears as a possible outcome. 
 
3.2  Theoretical modeling of monitoring and sanctions 
Most theoretical models of unemployment and job search ignore monitoring 
and the possibility of benefit sanctions as the outcome if a worker does not 
comply with search requirements. There are however a few exceptions that 
include papers by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995), Boone and van Ours (2000) 
and Boone et al. (2002). The partial equilibrium analysis by van den Berg and 
van der Klaauw (2001) is also of note. 
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) provide an interpretation of the Swedish 
unemployment experience by means of a calibrated search model.
8 The model 
is entirely focused on the supply side; in fact, there are no firms in the model 
and wages are exogenously given. Workers are risk neutral, can be employed 
or unemployed and optimize by choosing optimal reservation wages and search 
intensities. The government stipulates a “suitable wage” such that wage offers 
exceeding that wage can only be rejected at the risk of being exposed to a 
sanction, i.e., a withdrawal of benefits for the rest of the unemployment spell. 
The suitable wage effectively sets a floor on reservation wages. The risk of 
being exposed to a sanction is affected by another policy parameter that 
captures the monitoring technology attached to the UI system. The model is 
calibrated so as to produce aggregate labor market outcomes broadly similar to 
those experienced in Sweden. A rise in the suitable wage leads to a rise in 
                                                      
8 Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) is a related paper that interprets the European unemployment 
experience using a similar framework. 
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probability of detection when turning down a suitable wage offer leads to lower 
unemployment since it makes the unemployed keener to accept suitable wage 
offers. An interesting feature of the model is that it suggests a possibility of 
multiple equilibria if one assumes that monitoring is enforced less effectively 
when unemployment is high.  
Boone and van Ours (2000) also use a search model to explore links 
between the UI system and unemployment. The model here is version of the 
Pissarides (1990/2000) search and matching model and has similarities with the 
model in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001). Workers are risk averse, search 
effort among the unemployed is endogenous and wages are determined in bar-
gaining between the firm and the individual worker. A key assumption is that 
the unemployed and insured worker can affect the probability of continued UI 
receipt by the choice of search effort; the higher the search effort, the lower the 
risk of being exposed to a benefit sanction. This is the monitoring system in the 
model. The benefit associated with additional search thus involves two compo-
nents, one capturing the gain associated with a transition to employment and 
the other capturing the gain of not being penalized by a benefit sanction. 
Boone and van Ours calibrate their model to data for the Netherlands and 
undertake a number of simulations to shed light on the role of monitoring and 
sanctions in a general equilibrium setting. They note that the effects of moni-
toring and sanctions involve an ex ante effect capturing deterrence as well as an 
ex post effect capturing higher search effort among those actually exposed to a 
sanction. With a low monitoring rate, any action is produced by the ex post 
effect; with a high monitoring rate, the main action is driven by deterrence. It is 
conceivable that the ex post effect – which is possible to estimate by use of 
micro data (see below) – can be negligible despite an overall strong effect due 
to deterrence. The model illustrates that the risk of being sanctioned can have 
strong behavioral effects even if the penalty is modest.  
Which conclusions regarding the optimal design of UI can be drawn from 
the exercises presented in the two aforementioned papers? Ljungqvist and 
Sargent discusses welfare effects of alternative UI arrangements, but their 
model is of limited use for this purpose as it features risk neutral individuals 
and thus ignores the value of UI as a consumption-smoothing device. Boone 
and van Ours report (utilitarian) measures of welfare for alternative scenarios 
and conclude that policies involving monitoring and sanctions can be welfare 
improving. A difficulty here is that a proper welfare analysis requires that one 
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not come without costs. Any conclusion about the optimal set of instruments – 
replacement rates, monitoring rates, sanctions – is bound to be crucially de-
pendent on how costly it is to enforce stringent search requirements.  
The paper by Boone et al. (2002) examines to what extent the optimal UI 
policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed 
search is deemed insufficient. The framework is an equilibrium search model 
along the lines of Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) and Boone and van Ours 
(2000). The paper finds that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a 
welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclu-
sion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits 
and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt. The optimal 
sanction rates implied by the calibrated model are higher than the sanction rates 
typically observed in European labor markets. 
The paper by van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001) brings attention to 
the fact that the unemployed may use different search channels. A policy that 
affects only one search method may induce a substitution among search 
methods. The theoretical framework is a partial equilibrium search model with 
endogenous search effort and two search channels – formal and informal 
search. The wage-offer distributions, possibly channel-specific, are exogenous. 
One can think of formal search as search through the public employment 
service whereas informal search includes referrals through friends etc. Optimal 
behavior is characterized by a reservation wage rule and optimal search inten-
sities in the usual way. Monitoring takes the form of a minimum search 
requirement applied to the formal search channel (since it is difficult to monitor 
informal search). It may involve more checks on the number of job applica-
tions, more frequent visits to the employment office etc.  
Monitoring affects search to the extent that it bites, i.e., to the extent that 
minimum required search exceeds optimal formal search in the absence of 
monitoring. The effect on the transition rate to employment depends crucially 
on how search costs are specified. The reservation wage declines and the 
transition rate increases if channel-specific search costs are additive. In this 
case changes in formal search do not affect the marginal cost of informal 
search. The imposition of a binding search requirement makes it less attractive 
to be unemployed which implies greater willingness to accept job offers. An 
alternative assumption is that search costs depend on total search effort in such 
a way that formal and informal search become close or perfect substitutes. If 
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follows that a formal search requirement will reduce effort allocated to infor-
mal search. The effect on the transition rate to employment may then be zero. 
 
3.3 Empirical  evidence  on  monitoring and sanctions 
The empirical evidence on the effects of job search requirements is not over-
whelmingly large. A number of social experiments undertaken in the United 
States provide some relevant evidence (see the survey by Meyer, 1995). How-
ever, these experiments often combined stricter enforcement of search require-
ments with other treatments, such as job search assistance. This raises the 
question of whether the measured effects are due to monitoring or some other 
element of the treatment package. It turns out, however, that an inspection of 
the time paths of the effects can in some cases reveal interesting information 
about the role of job search requirements.  
The most convincing evidence is based on “work search” experiments un-
dertaken in the United States. One experiment was undertaken in the state of 
Washington in 1986-87 and another one in Maryland in 1994. Both studies in-
volved random assignments of unemployed benefit claimants into groups 
exposed to different search requirements. The experiences from the so-called 
Restart experiments in the United Kingdom are also of relevance. 
The Washington experimental study, described in Johnson and Kleppinger 
(1994), compared four different treatments: (i) elimination of work-search re-
quirement; (ii) standard requirement; (iii) individualized requirements; and (iv) 
intensive services. Individuals in the first category had essentially no search 
requirements. They were not required to report a specific number of employer 
contacts and UI payments were made automatically to claimants until they 
reported change of circumstance, such as return to work. The second category 
had requirements similar to what had been practiced in most states. Claimants 
had to make at least three employer contacts per week and those employers had 
to be listed on bi-weekly continued claims forms. Individuals in the third cate-
gory were subject to work-search treatments tailored to specific circumstances 
of their occupation or local labor market. The fourth category had job search 
assistance early in the unemployment spell.  
The study finds strong evidence that more stringent search requirements 
reduce the length of benefit receipt. Workers in the first category (no search 
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with standard requirements.
9 No search requirement also increased the risk of 
benefit exhaustion and increased the probability of being reemployed by the 
same employer. There is some evidence that workers in the first category had 
slightly higher reemployment wages in the short term, a finding consistent with 
higher reservation wages. However, there is no evidence of any longer-term 
effects on wages.  
In the Maryland experimental study, presented in Benus and Johnson 
(1997), benefit claimants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups and 
two control groups. The control groups were required to follow the standard 
requirements at the time, including the report of at least two employer contacts 
per week (although without any verification of the contacts). Participants in one 
of the control group were informed that they were part of an experimental 
study. The treatments were as follows: (i) increased work-search requirements 
by requiring workers to make at least four employer contacts per week; (ii) 
requiring two employer contacts per week but without any requirement of 
documentation; (iii) a requirement that workers should attend a four-day job 
search workshop early during the unemployment spell; and (iv) information to 
the claimants that their reported employer contacts would be verified. 
The results from the Maryland study suggest that increased search require-
ments can have non-trivial behavioral effects. Increasing the number of re-
quired employer contacts from two to four reduced the duration of benefit 
receipt by 6 percent. Informing claimants that their employer contacts would be 
verified reduced the duration of benefit receipt by 7.5 percent. Participation in 
the job search workshop reduced the number of benefit weeks by 5 percent, a 
finding broadly consistent with results from other experiments undertaken in 
the United States. The effect could reflect enhanced skills in job search but may 
also reflect higher perceived costs of remaining on UI (as the workshop reduces 
time available for leisure). In fact, the Maryland study suggests that the latter 
interpretation may be most plausible. The effect is largely driven by a sharp 
increase in exit rates from unemployment prior to the scheduled workshop. 
This finding is consistent with the results from the Washington experiment on 
the impact of job search assistance. 
                                                      
9 Anderson (2001) argues that the strong effect on duration in the Washington experiment may 
be upward biased due to certain features of the experiment. 
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domized experiments intended to measure whether stricter enforcement and 
verification of job search activities reduce UI claims. The experiments were 
implemented in four states – Connecticut, Massachusetts, Virginia and 
Tennessee – in 1984-85. The treatments included stated attempts to verify job 
search activities and also actual verifications (such as in depth interviews 
concerning the claimant’s search effort).
 10 The study finds at most a very small 
effect on benefit payments. It should be noted, however, that the treatment in 
these experiments kicked in only during the first two weeks of the unemploy-
ment spell, before any benefits had been paid out. Therefore it is difficult to 
infer anything about the effects of more intense and long-lasting monitoring, 
such as weekly verification of job search activities throughout the unemploy-
ment spell. 
Dolton and O’Neill (1996) report evidence from the Restart experiments in 
the United Kingdom. Individuals with elapsed unemployment of six months 
were randomly assigned to participation in an interview to counsel them on 
active job search (the treatment group). Failure to attend the interview carried 
an explicit risk of losing benefits. The control group consisted of individuals 
that were not notified to attend an interview. The study reports that the 
notification of an interview had a statistically significant positive effect on exit 
rates to employment. The magnitude of the effect on the job exit rate is also 
substantial (around 30 percent). 
Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001) report results from a small ex-
periment undertaken at two local employment offices undertaken in the 
Netherlands. The treatments involved counseling as well as monitoring, both 
presumably affecting formal search. The study cannot find any support for the 
claim that monitoring and counseling raises the transition rate from unemploy-
ment to employment. The interpretation favored by the authors is that moni-
toring of formal search induced a substitution away from informal search chan-
nels. 
Keeley and Robins (1985) is one of the first econometric studies of the 
impact of job search requirements. The paper examines transitions from unem-
ployment to employment using US data on unemployment spells from 1980. 
The data included detailed information on the job search process as well as job 
                                                      
10 The Ashenfelter et al. study has also appeared in a slightly revised version as IZA Discussion 
Paper No 128.  
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self-reported information on whether the respondent was required to look for 
work. Job search requirement is a zero-one variable: one if the individual 
reports that he is required to look for work and zero otherwise. The variation in 
search requirements thus appears to be driven by different search rules across 
government programs (to the extent that those rules were well understood). The 
analysis suggests that job search requirements affect the job search process. For 
example, they increase the number of search methods used and hours of search 
per week. Search requirements appear to reduce the number of direct employer 
contacts. There is no evidence that search requirements reduce the duration of 
unemployment, however. It is speculated that this result reflects substitution 
among different methods of job search, such as an increase in hours of job 
search at the expense of direct employer contacts.  
Although the Keeley and Robins study is of interest, the evidence it presents 
on the effects of job search requirements is less convincing than the results 
from randomized work search experiments. For one thing, the measure of job 
search requirements is a rather crude indicator. Moreover, the identification 
strategy employed by Keeley and Robins seems to rely on the strong assump-
tion that the only relevant difference between programs is whether or not they 
are associated with search requirements. 
Econometric evidence on the effects UI sanctions has been presented by 
Abbring et al. (1998). A closely related paper by van den Berg et al. (1998) 
examines the effects of sanctions for welfare recipients. Both these studies 
examine exit rates from nonemployment using data from the Netherlands. The 
UI sanctions typically involve a cut in benefits in the range of 5 to 35 percent 
and are imposed for failures to meet certain search requirements. Abbring et al. 
estimate a duration model using two different samples, one where workers’ 
were previously employed in the metal industry and the other pertaining to the 
banking sector. The key parameter of interest captures the change in the exit 
rate from unemployment to employment at the point in time where a sanction 
kicks in.  
The estimates indicate remarkably strong effects of the imposition of a 
benefit sanction. For the metal industry, the transition rate from unemployment 
to employment increases by 77 percent; for the banking sector, the estimated 
effect is even larger (107 percent). If these numbers are translated into an 
elasticity of the exit rate with respect to the benefit level, the (absolute value of 
the) elasticity may be as high as 3. The estimate is well above existing esti-
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den Berg (1998) et al. of transitions from welfare to work also indicates that 
benefit sanctions can have substantial behavioral effects. When a benefit sanc-
tion is imposed, the transition to work is found to increase by over 100 percent. 
The recent study by Lalive et al. (2002) investigates how benefit sanctions 
affect unemployment duration in Switzerland, a country where monitoring and 
sanctions play an important role in the UI system (Grubb, 2001). The data at 
hand include information on warnings as well as actual enforcements of benefit 
sanctions. The paper finds that both warning and enforcement raises the out-
flow rate from unemployment. These effects are quantitatively important. 
 
3.4 Summary  and  discussion 
Real-world UI systems do not pay out benefits unconditionally. By contrast, 
there are generally certain requirements on search activity and availability for 
work. The problem is to enforce these requirements in an optimal manner, 
recognizing that monitoring is not a free good. The theoretical literature on law 
enforcement has some fairly clear implications on this matter. The more costly 
monitoring is, the less should be spent on monitoring activities and the larger 
should the sanction be. This tradeoff is also illustrated in some of the econom-
ics literature on UI. A crucial difficulty, however, is to quantify the costs of 
monitoring. Empirical estimates appear to be virtually non-existing in this area. 
The presence of a monitoring and sanctions system involves an ex ante 
effect as well as an ex post effect. The available evidence suggests that the ex 
post effect may be quite powerful, i.e., a benefit sanction seems to induce a 
sharp increase in the exit rate from nonemployment into employment. Empiri-
cal evidence on ex ante effects is harder to arrive at, especially if one is inter-
ested in the general equilibrium effects. The numerical results from calibrated 
search models indicate, however, that the ex ante effects can be quite impor-
tant. 
Our reading of the empirical literature on search requirements and job 
search is that monitoring matters for search behavior and that more stringent 
search requirements is likely to speed up transitions to employment. A recent 
study by Black et al. (1999) provides further support for this assessment. (The 
Black et al. study is presented in the next section.) The empirical evidence is 
not wholly conclusive, however; one or two studies seem to suggest that 
increased monitoring has little or no effect on search behavior. It is possible 
that substitution between different search channels, such as formal and 
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11 We find it hard to believe, 
however, that formal and informal search should be perfect substitutes, an 
assumption needed to rationalize the absence of effects of increased monitor-
ing. Moreover, it is likely that specification of general search requirements, 
such as the number of job applications filed during a week, should minimize 




The idea that benefit claimants should be required to work in exchange for 
benefits has a long tradition and many countries have implemented this idea in 
practice. The stated reasons for workfare vary. Broadly, there are three argu-
ments for introducing workfare. One argument is that workfare may make 
income transfers to the unemployed more politically acceptable. Another idea 
is that workfare may serve as a screening tool when individuals differ with 
respect to valuations of leisure or earnings capacity. The case for screening is 
essentially that it may improve the targeting of transfers. A third view is a 
version of the deterrent argument that was discussed above in the context of 
monitoring. If benefit claimants are required to substitute work for leisure, they 
may be more eager to leave unemployment.  
 
4.1  Workfare versus welfare 
The case for workfare has been analyzed in considerable detail in recent public 
finance literature.
12 These contributions apply optimal taxation theory and 
explore under what conditions workfare may be part of an optimal policy as a 
complement to (non-linear) taxes and subsidies. There are essentially two 
classes of social objectives considered, one being conventional “welfarist” and 
the other being “non-welfarist”. With welfarist objectives, the government is 
only concerned with individual welfare as given by the individuals’ prefer-
ences. In the usual setup, this implies that the policy maker cares about indi-
                                                      
11 Tranæs (2001) suggests another mechanism that my overturn the case for search requirements. 
His argument is that more stringent search requirements may induce some unemployed workers 
to search for jobs only to meet the requirements.  
12 The public finance literature on workfare includes papers by Beaudry and Blackorby (1998), 
Besley and Coate (1992, 1995), Brett (1998), Chambers (1989) and Cuff (2000). 
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objective function is the prime example of a welfarist social objective. If the 
government has non-welfarist objectives, it may give zero weight to the value 
of leisure and focus exclusively on income. An example is the contributions by 
Besley and Coate (1992, 1995), which provide a detailed analysis of workfare 
as an income maintenance (or poverty alleviation) program. In this analysis, the 
objective is to ensure that each individual gets a minimum income level at 
minimum fiscal cost. 
The optimal taxation approach to workfare features worker heterogeneity in 
one or two dimensions: earning capacity in the market (ability or wage rates) 
and/or disutility of labor. Beaudry and Blackorby (1998) consider heterogene-
ity in home sector productivity, which may be observationally equivalent to 
heterogeneity in the disutility of labor. Wage rates are taken as exogenous and 
independent of the chosen policies. Workfare is typically assumed to be 
completely unproductive. The precise assumptions regarding what the govern-
ment can observe vary across studies. The common assumptions are that the 
government can observe individual labor earnings but not individual wage rates 
or preferences for leisure. The presence of asymmetric information – the 
individuals know their wage rates and valuations of leisure but the government 
does not – gives rise to a screening problem. The optimal policy must be 
incentive compatible, i.e., it must give individuals incentives to choose “their 
own” benefit package. For example, the policy must be such that high-ability 
individuals cannot gain by pretending to be of low ability and claim a benefit 
package intended for those with low ability.  
The papers by Besley and Coate establish a number of results regarding 
workfare as a poverty-alleviation instrument in a model where individuals have 
identical preferences but differ in their market wage rates. The objective is to 
guarantee each individual a minimum income at the lowest budgetary cost. 
Workfare takes the form a requirement to work in an unproductive public-
sector job. In case workfare is implemented, it crowds out some private-sector 
output by reducing time spent in private-sector work. It is shown that workfare 
may be part of a cost-minimizing policy when the government is unable to 
observe wage rates and incomes and also when incomes (but not wage rates) 
are observable.  
In a two-class model (Besley and Coate, 1992), the high-ability individuals 
are offered no benefits whereas those claiming to be of low ability are offered 
an income transfer in exchange for a work requirement. However, those of high 
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work requirement is chosen so as to make high-ability individuals indifferent 
between claiming to be of low ability and receiving no benefit at all. The 
optimality of workfare is more likely to occur if there is a large wage differen-
tial between high and low ability workers and if the fraction of low-ability 
workers is small relative to the whole target population. When those conditions 
are met, the crowding-out effect from workfare is modest and the cost saving 
from excluding high-ability workers from benefits dominates the crowding-out 
effect.  
The optimality of workfare within a welfarist approach has been examined 
by Cuff (2000). The individuals in this model differ along two dimensions: 
ability and the disutility of labor. It is shown that it may be part of the optimal 
package to impose a work requirement on low ability individuals who have a 
low disutility of labor. Cuff also shows that workfare is never optimal when all 
individuals have the same ability, unless they are more productive in workfare 
than in the private sector. Beaudry and Blackorby (1998) derive a similar 
result. However, they also demonstrate that workfare may be welfare-
improving if some individuals lack private-sector employment opportunities. In 
the latter case, introduction of workfare would not crowd out private-sector 
output due to reduced labor supply among low-ability individuals. 
All in all, the conditions required to rationalize workfare are fairly stringent 
in the existing public finance literature. It would be wrong, however, to con-
clude from this literature that workfare cannot be a useful complement to 
unemployment insurance. In fact, the models discussed above are not well 
suited to deal with unemployment and UI as they typically focus on uncon-
strained labor supply decisions. It is conceivable that the case for workfare is 
stronger when one considers problems of moral hazard and screening in the 
design of UI. 
 
4.2  Workfare and unemployment insurance 
Jackman (1994) and others have suggested a social insurance role for active 
labor market policy (ALMP). The idea is a version of the self-selection (or 
screening) argument discussed above. ALMP as workfare – the requirement to 
participate in a labor market program in exchange for benefits – effectively 
puts a price on individuals’ time. Those who put a high value on their leisure 
time may self-select out of the benefit system and only those really needy 
would remain as benefit claimants.  
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fare in a model where individuals may have the same productivity but differ 
with respect to their preferences for leisure. There are two types of individuals, 
referred to as workers (with low disutility of labor) and non-workers (with high 
disutility of labor). The government knows the distribution of individual 
characteristics but not the preferences of a particular individual. Job search 
effort and job acceptance decisions are also private information to the individu-
als. The paper examines whether workfare can be a Pareto improving welfare 
reform, i.e., whether it is possible to improve welfare for one type of individu-
als without worsening conditions for the other type. The answer is affirmative: 
workfare works as a welfare improving screening device if individuals are 
sufficiently heterogeneous with respect to their valuations of leisure. 
The intuition for this result is as follows. When preferences and job search 
behavior are private information, even non-workers (who do not search for 
work) may claim UI benefits. This reduces the scope for UI as income insur-
ance for workers (who do search for work). By introducing a work require-
ment, the government can induce non-workers to self-select out of the UI 
system, the reason being that they have a strong preference for leisure. At the 
margin, it is possible to simultaneously raise UI benefits and introduce a work 
requirement so as to make non-workers indifferent between claiming and not 
claiming UI benefits. The rise in UI benefits represents a strictly positive wel-
fare improvement for workers.  
Empirical work on the effects of workfare per se is, to our knowledge, 
rather limited. However, the evidence regarding the effects of monitoring 
discussed above is arguably relevant also in this case, at least to the extent that 
it is possible to identify the effect of a “threat” of being exposed to a labor 
market program. The study by Benus and Johnson (1997) is a case in point. 
The treatment involving participation in a four-week job-search training work-
shop reduced the average duration of UI payments. Interestingly, the overall 
impact came largely through a substantial (28 percent) increase in exit rates 
from UI for the two weeks immediately preceding the date of the scheduled 
workshop, suggesting that the workshop increased the cost of remaining on UI. 
A recent study by Black et al. (1999) also provides fairly conclusive evi-
dence in favor of the hypothesis that the mere threat of being placed in a labor 
market program can reduce time spent on UI and boost job findings. The paper 
examines the effects of a randomized experiment undertaken in Kentucky in 
the early 1990s. The experiment involved random assignment of unemployed 
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those services was required in order to continue as benefit recipient. Positive 
human capital effects aside, the treatment may have raised the costs of con-
tinued UI claims. 
Black et al. find that treatment reduced the mean UI duration by about 2.2 
weeks. The effects are primarily driven by a marked rise in reemployment in 
the first and second quarters after filing the UI claim, in most cases taking 
place before the possible receipt of the reemployment services. This suggests 
that the mere threat of being exposed to the services induced a rise in exit rates.  
 
4.3 Summary  and  discussion 
Most theoretical work on workfare has been cast in an optimal taxation frame-
work that is not ideal for an analysis of unemployment issues. In fact, the role 
of workfare as an integral part of the UI system has been subject to very little 
research. Although the idea that active labor market policies can be used to test 
the willingness to work has been around for some time, it has rarely been 
thoroughly developed. Recent theoretical work has, however, made some 
progress on this front and suggested a possible role for workfare as a screening 
device. By introducing workfare it becomes possible to induce individuals less 
interested in work to self-select out of the UI system, thereby allowing more 
generous compensation for those keener to get a job. Recent empirical work 
has suggested that “the threat of training” may be more effective than training 
itself, a result indicating that workfare may well be used as a means to speed up 
job finding. 
The wider question is whether workfare is more or less effective than other 
policy instruments in this area, such as limited duration of benefit payments or 
monitoring and sanction systems. To our knowledge, no study has systemati-
cally explored how workfare fares in comparison to other conceivable policy 
instruments. In companion paper to this survey, we attempt to take a step in this 
direction (Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2003).  
 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
In this paper, we have discussed some crucial design features of unemployment 
insurance in the light of recent research. In particular, we have focused on three 
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benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. 
Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a pen-
alty on less active job search is fairly solid. In fact, the three instruments that 
we have considered are different ways of doing just that. A declining sequence 
of benefit payments punishes long unemployment spells and, hence, low search 
intensity (albeit indirectly). By regularly monitoring individuals’ search activ-
ity, those who search less actively run a greater risk of being subjected to a 
benefit sanction. Also, there is some support for the idea that workfare may 
serve as a screening device. By subjecting individuals to a work test, it is 
possible to induce individuals less interested in work to self-select out of UI. 
The empirical evidence is broadly in line with the above conclusion. The 
outflow from unemployment tends to increase around the time when UI 
benefits expire or around the time when a work test is administered. Moreover, 
the weight of the empirical evidence suggests that more stringent search re-
quirements induce active job search.  
Are there any caveats to the conclusion that the generosity of the benefit 
system should decline over the worker’s unemployment spell? We think that 
there are two important ones. The first objection is that it may be optimal to 
impose a “tax” on entry into unemployment by offering low benefits during the 
first week(s) of unemployment. The most convincing argument for having a tax 
on unemployment entry is that it discourages the use of temporary layoffs 
subsidized by UI. However, this argument does not necessarily invalidate the 
argument for having a declining benefit sequence. Temporary layoffs can also 
be taken care of by experience rating provisions, imposed either on firms that 
engage in frequent layoffs (as in the US) or individuals that are frequently 
unemployed.  
The second objection arises from the possibility of self-insurance via pre-
cautionary savings. If all unemployed workers have access to a market for 
saving and borrowing this weakens the case for a reduction in benefit generos-
ity during the course of the unemployment spell. The relevance of this objec-
tion is an empirical issue. We view it as extremely unlikely that unemployed 
individuals can use their human capital as collateral for borrowing. Never-
theless, private savings (including family transfers) can work reasonably well 
as a substitute to UI for very short spells of unemployment. For this reason, we 
think that the existence of private savings may provide an additional argument 
for having a waiting period before benefits are paid out. 
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to provide a statement on whether one instrument is more efficient than the 
other. This is the subject of a companion paper (Fredriksson and Holmlund, 
2003) and an important topic for future research. 
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